Fluctuations in GDP are more synchronized internationally than ßuctuations in Consumption, and they remain so even between Þnancially integrated economies, where the ranking should in theory be the reverse. This paper shows this happens because correlations in GDP ßuctuations rise with Þnancial integration. Finance serves to increase international correlations in both consumption and GDP ßuc-tuations, which explains the persistent gap between the two in the data. The positive association between Þnancial integration and GDP correlation constitutes a puzzle, as theory suggests a negative relation if anything. Nevertheless, it prevails in the data even after the effects of Þnance on trade and specialization are accounted for.
Introduction
In theory, consumption patterns between Þnancially integrated regions should be more synchronized than production, for two reasons. First, capital ßows follow returns differentials, which results in negative output correlations.
1 Second, agents consume out of a fully diversiÞed portfolio wealth, resulting in perfectly correlated consumption plans. The overwhelming rejection of this ranking in the data was famously labelled a "quantity puzzle" by Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1994) . This paper shows the main reason for the anomaly lies in the response of output correlations to Þnancial links, not in that of consumption.
There are two prominent and non exclusive explanations to the quantity puzzle. Hypothesis A -Capital ßows are restricted, effective diversiÞcation is limited and consumption plans remain largely idiosyncratic, and less correlated internationally than GDP ßuctuations.
Hypothesis B -Capital ßows are governed by motives reßective of imperfect information, and tend to herd rather than respond to differentials in returns. Thus, ßuctuations in output can become more rather than less synchronized between Þnan-cially integrated regions. This paper constructs a cross-section of bilateral output and consumption correlations across countries to investigate the relevance of these conjectures.
Unsurprisingly, the data suggest that Þnancial integration results in signiÞcantly higher consumption correlations. This result, akin to Lewis (1996) , provides support in favor of hypothesis A. The quantity puzzle is a manifestation of restrictions to capital ßows, and, holding output correlations constant, the discrepancy diminishes once restrictions to capital ßows are accounted for. That said however, in the data output correlations are not invariant to Þnancial ßows, and indeed tend to rise with Þnancial integration, as under hypothesis B. In fact, increases in output and consumption correlations are roughly of equal magnitudes, so much so that the discrepancy is invariant to capital ßows. In the data, consumption remains less correlated than output even between Þnancially integrated economies, and this happens not because risk-sharing and consumption correlations are low, but rather because Þnance synchronizes GDP ßuctuations. While the former effect is consistent with theory, the latter is not, and holds therefore the key to the quantity puzzle.
Two immediate explanations spring to mind. First, there is increasing evidence that Þnancial ßows depend on the information afforded by goods trade, and are predicted by the same gravity model that captures trade in goods.
2 And theoretically, a balance of payments view suggests integration in the goods and assets markets may go hand in hand. Thus, the measured effect of Þnance on cycle synchronization could be but a reßection of the well-known fact that trade partners experience synchronized business cycles, due to Frankel and Rose (1998) . Second, Þnance affords specialization, in either different or similar economic activities. One view contends that access to asset markets unhinges consumption from production, which then becomes free to specialize according to comparative advantage, for instance. Financially integrated economies would then tend to specialize differently, and be less synchronized as a result. On the other hand, Þnance may afford specialization in activities particularly needful of external funds, for instance risky ones as in Obstfeld (1994) . Financially integrated economies would then tend to specialize similarly, and be more synchronized as a result. 3 Therefore, the measured effect of Þnance on synchronization could merely reßect Þnance-induced specialization.
This paper disentangles these channels, using a simultaneous equation approach to identify a strong residual direct effect of Þnance on cycle synchronization, over and above indirect channels working via goods trade or specialization. In particular, Þnan-cial integration is shown to increase goods trade, as well as specialization. Depending on the measure used, Þnance-induced specialization appears to occur in similar economic activities, thus lending credence to Obstfeld (1994) conjecture. In most cases however, the residual (direct) effect of Þnance on cycles remains, and it is larger than the effect on consumption correlations. Understanding the reason why holds the key to the quantity puzzle.
The paper confronts two empirical difficulties. First, until recently, the measurement of international Þnancial integration has been hampered by the lack of public data on bilateral capital ßows for other economies than the US. 4 The alternative approaches making up for this absence include the standard indices of restrictions to capital accounts published by the IMF or proxies based on net external positions. Here however, 2 See Oh, Portes and Rey (2001) or Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2003) . 3 For evidence going the former way, see Kalemli-Ozcan et al (2001 . For evidence going the latter way see Rajan and Zingales (1998) . For evidence that both effects are at play at different horizons, see Fisman and Love (2003) actual data on bilateral asset holdings, recently made available for a large sample of country pairs in 2001, are used to directly measure the extent of Þnancial integration.
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A second issue pertains to the endogeneity of Þnancial integration to business cycles. International business cycles theory suggests that, if unfettered, capital should ßow between countries at different stages of their business cycles. This induces a negative endogeneity bias on regressions explaining cycle synchronization with access to Þnance. The paper uses institutions-based instruments for Þnancial integration inspired from LaPorta et al (1998) to account for this possibility. 6 The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature and introduces the paper's estimation and data. The main results are in Section 3, with estimates of the effect of Þnance on GDP correlations, followed by a decomposition into its direct and indirect components. Section 4 turns to risk-sharing, compares the effects of Þnance on correlations in consumption and in GDP, and shows the discrepancy is invariant to Þnancial integration. Section 5 concludes.
Methodology
This Section reviews the relevant literature and introduces the estimation methodology. Data sources and a description of the main variables follow.
Literature
This paper borrows from two distinct literatures: one concerned with risk sharing and its relation with consumption correlations, the other concerned with international business cycles synchronization. They are both reviewed next.
Under complete markets, the social planner equates the marginal utilities of consumption across countries, adjusted for the real exchange rate if Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) does not hold. Abstracting from non traded goods -if they are separable in utility-isoelastic preferences then imply that consumption plans be perfectly correlated. They are not. Lewis (1999) surveys three explanations. (i) Traded and non 5 For a description of these data, see Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2003) . They are concerned with the determinants of capital ßows, while the focus here is on their consequences on the real economy. 6 The presence of this bias only makes a positive coefficient harder to obtain. Although it is accounted for in what follows, endogeneity works against the results in the paper. traded goods are imperfect substitutes in consumption, and it is only the marginal utilities of consumption in traded goods that are equated internationally. (ii) There are restrictions to international diversiÞcation, and (iii) the gains from risk sharing are too small to motivate actual diversiÞcation.
A considerable literature has evaluated the empirical content of these explanations. Tesar (1993) and Stockman and Tesar (1995) show that, in theory, introducing nontraded goods can lower the international correlation between consumption growth rates. But Lewis (1997) shows that domestic consumption continues to correlate signiÞcantly with domestic output even when non-traded goods are accounted for, an indication that consumption insurance is imperfect. However, Lewis (1996) shows that when corrections for both the presence of non-traded goods consumption and institutional restrictions to capital ßows are performed, the coefficient becomes non signiÞcant. Her results are indicative that income insurance exists in the data when measured appropriately, and if not hampered by regulatory restrictions. Alternative, more recent, approaches propose to investigate the extent of risksharing allowing for deviations from PPP. In a sample of twelve OECD countries, Ravn (2003) Þnds that adjusting for variations in the real exchange rate is largely irrelevant for tests of risk sharing based on observed consumption plans, even though the adjustment is crucial in theory. Brandt, Cochrane and Santa Clara (2003) take the opposite route and reason that the real exchange rate is directly observable whereas marginal utilities are not. They argue the volatility of marginal utilities implied by equity premia dwarves the volatility of the real exchange rate, by a factor of three. Purely observable asset prices point to extensive risk sharing, that model-based quantities may well overlook completely.
While the evidence based on quantities is at best weakly supportive of risk sharing, asset prices imply on the contrary extensive international insurance. This paper deals exclusively with quantities (and the afferent puzzle), and therefore cannot shed light on this apparent contradiction. Rather, it purports to stress the systematic effect of Þnancial integration on international output correlations. Quantity-based measures do suggest little risk sharing internationally, but that is not the only (nor perhaps the main) reason for the quantity puzzle.
Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1994) remains the workhorse model of international 7 Lane (2001) presents dissenting evidence, based on assets yields, suggestive that holdings of foreign assets do not generate income insurance. He concludes the jury is still very much out, as his results do not rule out some income insurance via capital gains rather than asset yields. business cycles. Kehoe and Perri (2002) introduce a model in the same tradition, where limited enforcement is crucial in determining the international correlations of output and consumption. In Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1994) , complete markets result in negatively correlated GDP because capital ßows into the economy hit by a positive technology shock, and away from the no-shock economy. Kehoe and Perri show that limited enforcement results in lower capital ßows, as the value of defaulting would increase in the booming economy if it indeed were the recipient of international investment. As a result, the social planner endogenously limits capital ßows, and international GDP correlations are higher. By the same token, without limited enforcement, citizens of the country with the positive shock would normally share their gains with the rest of the world. But having to do so once again increases the value of default, so risk sharing is limited and consumption growth rates are less correlated. Models with exogenously restricted access to bond markets have drastically different implications, as negative output correlations and large consumption correlations obtain, if to a lesser extent than in the canonical complete markets model. In short, the quantity puzzle is resolved, because there are endogenous limitations to capital ßows and risk sharing, resulting in higher GDP correlations, and in lower consumption correlations. If large capital ßows are observed, however, the theory continues to imply negatively correlated GDP ßuctuations, even with limited enforcement.
We know little about the relation between Þnancial integration and cycles synchronization in the data, probably more because there is little data than for lack of interest. Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2003) is an exception, which Þnds some evidence that Þ-nancially open developing economies have synchronized cycles with a core of rich G7 countries. But their focus is mainly on correlations in output as opposed to consumption, and they do not use the CPIS data on effective asset cross-holdings. Bordo and Helbling (2003) document a long-run increase in cycles synchronization, but conclude little of it can be ascribed to Þnancial integration as proxied by the removal of capital controls. They conÞrm the important conceptual difference between de jure measures based on restrictions to capital ßows, and de factor ones, which did not exist for many countries until recently.
International correlations in GDP ßuctuations are an object of intense scrutiny in their own right, beyond the role of Þnance. A considerable empirical literature has concerned itself with their determinants, and provides guidance in choosing the speciÞcation in this paper. Frankel and Rose Þnd a large and signiÞcant effect of bilateral intensity, a result conÞrmed in numerous subsequent studies.
8 Imbs (2001) , Clark and 8 And sometimes questioned on theoretical ground, as for instance in Kose and Yi (2002) . vanWincoop (2001) or Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen and Yosha (2001) document a signiÞ-cant impact of specialization patterns, as economies with the same sectors tend to be subjected to similar shocks. Alesina, Barro and Tenreyro (2002) or Rose (2000) stress the importance of currency unions, working indirectly via increased trade. Finally, Imbs (2004) assesses the relative magnitude of these channels going both directly and indirectly from trade integration, specialization and Þnancial integration to business cycles synchronization.
Estimation
The paper has three objectives: estimating the link between (i) Þnancial integration and GDP correlations, (ii) Þnancial integration and risk-sharing as measured by consumption correlations, and (iii) the difference between the two effects. The signs of relations (i) and (ii) are obtained following well established estimation methods. Evaluating (iii) requires combining insights coming from two different literatures.
Starting with Frankel and Rose (1998) , a ßurry of papers have taken interest in the empirical determinants of international GDP correlations. Most of them estimate variants of
where ρ Y ij denotes the Pearson correlation between the cyclical components of GDP countries i and j, T ij captures the intensity of bilateral goods trade between the two countries, S ij is a measure of similarities in sectoral patterns of production, and X ij is a vector of control variables affecting ρ Y ij directly, including for instance the convergence in policies or currency unions. α 1 is the coefficient of interest. Next section discusses in detail how all variables are measured. Equation (1) only provides reduced form estimates for the effects Þnance, trade and structure on cycles synchronization, but no notion of indirect as against direct effects. For instance, estimates of α 1 in equation (1) embed the direct impact of Þnance on cycles, but also its putative indirect effects working via goods trade or specialization. The coefficient could be signiÞcantly positive just because access to Þnancial markets boosts T ij (and thus indirectly ρ Y ij ), or affords specialization in risky sectors, without there being any direct effects of Þnance on cycles. To disentangle direct from indirect channels, a simultaneous equation approach akin to Imbs (2004) is proposed, which estimates jointly the system (S):
Any direct impact of Þnance on cycles are captured by estimates of α 1 . In turn, γ 1 .α 2 and δ 1 .α 3 capture the indirect effects of Þnance working via trade and specialization, respectively. The system also allows for the possibility that it is the pre-existence of trade linkages that tends to result in capital ßows, with β 1 .
9 IdentiÞcation of the system (S) requires distinct instruments sets for Φ, T and S. One of this paper's contribution is to instrument Þnancial integration with institutional variables, making econometric use of the result in La Porta et al (1998) that legal institutions are important determinants of Þnancial development. Their result is extended to bilateral Þnancial depth, and indeed, the development of domestic Þnancial markets is likely to result in international Þnancial linkages. This will for instance happen as international investors Þnd it easier to access to domestic assets, or as the degree of sophistication associated with domestic Þnancial transactions extend to international operations.
Instruments for trade and specialization are standard. An enormous empirical literature has relied on the gravity model of international trade in choosing instruments for T , as geographic variables are both obviously exogenous and strong predictors of trade ßows. Specialization patterns, and in particular whether two countries share similar activities, is less easy to instrument. Imbs (2004) builds on Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) in arguing the level of development is a prominent determinant of specialization patterns. S is instrumented with both the pairwise sum and difference of per capita GDP, reasoning that rich economies tend to be more diversiÞed, and thus potentially more similar, whereas poor countries are specialized, typically in different primary products.
These choices for I 1 , I 2 and I 3 enable identiÞcation of the system (S), and also tackle issues of endogeneity, for instance of T to ρ Y . In particular, Þnancial integration is endogenous in equation (1), since agents may choose to diversify and invest in economies whose cyclical properties are different from their own. This is an attenuating bias, and thus makes the result that α 1 > 0 even more remarkable, but instrumented variables estimations helps ensuring the bias is indeed that suggested by theory.
Equation (1) and the system (S) are both based on a cross-section of bilateral GDP correlations. The cross-sectional approach is ill-suited to answer an important dimension of this paper's title question: to what extent is a periphery of relatively poorer economies becoming more synchronized with a core of richer ones (but not between themselves) as they become recipients of larger capital ßows.
11 To establish whether the cross-sectional evidence extend to a core-periphery approach, the paper proceeds by estimating equation (1) and the system (S) using variables computed between a core of 12 rich economies and a periphery of 31 countries. This also partly alleviates the concern that some of the cross-sectional variation in ρ Y ij be driven by unmeasured policy coordination. Indeed, member countries of the European Monetary Union, the European Union, or other policy arrangements involving rich OECD countries are part of the core, and GDP ßuctuations between them are excluded from the analysis.
Under complete markets, ßuctuations in consumption capture the residual uninsurable uncertainty. If a complete set of Arrow-Debreu securities is available, the remaining uncertainty in consumption stems from uninsurable shocks, whose realization affects identically all traders. Consumption plans are then perfectly correlated internationally. In particular, consumption plans should be unaffected by domestic income. This is the key to Lewis' (1996) result that β in ∆ ln C jt = θ t + β ∆ ln Y jt + ε jt ceases to be signiÞcant when non traded goods consumption and Þnancial constraints are controlled for, where j indexes countries in her case. While Lewis's approach provides a test for risk-sharing, it does not quantify directly the impact of restrictions to Þnancial ßows on risk sharing. An alternative, closer in spirit to this paper's objective, consists in a bilateral version of Lewis's estimation, and (2003) Þnd no evidence that the dynamics of specialization are related in any way with growth patterns. Further, this instrumentation is non-essential for the identiÞcation of the system (S), which can also be achieved simpy with I 1 6 = I 2 . Indeed, no results change when S is not instrumented at all.
where ρ C ij denotes the correlation in consumption ßuctuations between countries i and j. Equation (2) can readily include corrections for non traded goods consumption or for the real exchange rate. Of course Φ ij could be low but risk sharing high if both countries choose to trade assets with the rest of the world rather than with each other. Thus, a non signiÞcant η 1 does not necessarily rule against risk sharing. Nevertheless, a signiÞcantly positive estimate for η 1 is sufficient to ascertain there is risk sharing between countries i and j, and furthermore makes it possible to assess the magnitude of the effect on consumption correlations. This last feature is crucial from the point of view of the quantity puzzle this paper is concerned with.
It is important to control for GDP correlations ρ Y ij in equation (2). First, consumption plans can appear to be synchronized internationally simply because output ßuctuations are too, even though there is no risk sharing at all. Second, it is possible that Þnancial integration be independently related with GDP correlations (indeed the very purpose of estimation (1)). Then, positive and signiÞcant estimates of η 1 in simple bivariate estimations of equation (2) could simply reßect that Þnance synchronizes GDP, and thus consumption plans, without any risk sharing at all. GDP correlations in equation (2) are endogenous, the reason why estimating equation (1) made sense. The third relation this paper seeks to estimate is the differential effect of Þnance on ρ C ij and on ρ Y ij . This will be given by the joint estimates of α 1 and η 1 in the system formed by equations (1) and (2),
Armed with simultaneous estimates for α 1 and η 1 , one can directly evaluate to what extent Þnancial restrictions are the key to the quantity puzzle. Theory has it that α 1 < 0 and η 1 > 0, which, if true, suggests the quantity puzzle simply arises from the fact that the world is not integrated Þnancially. If however η 1 > 0 but α 1 > 0, the quantity puzzle stems from the positive association between capital ßows and GDP correlations. In both cases, point estimates can help address a quantitative question too: how much Þnancial integration is necessary to actually equate consumption and output correlations in the data.
Measurement and Data
In the past, it has been notoriously difficult to measure effective Þnancial integration between countries. Typical measures include indices capturing balance of payment restrictions, measures of net foreign positions or estimated indices of risk sharing. But restrictions only affect capital ßows de jure, not necessarily de facto. And alternatives are at best estimated approximations. One of this paper's contributions is to use a recently released dataset with direct observations on bilateral asset holdings. The data are gathered by the IMF in the context of a Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) covering assets holdings between 67 source and up to 223 destination countries in 2001. Holdings are decomposed into equities, short-term and long-term debt securities, which makes it possible to evaluate whether different components of international investment have distinct effects on real variables.
12 For each type of capital, bilateral holdings are computed as
where I ij denotes investment ßows from country i to country j, or, alternatively, in an intensive form given by
where I i = P j I ij . Different estimations in the text make use of either expression, but a sensitivity analysis in Section 5 shows the main results do not depend on which measure is used.
The paper also uses standard measures for Þnancial integration, namely the restrictions indices published in the IMF's Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER).
13 They are summed pairwise, and report the average number of countries with restrictions to Þnancial ßows, for each country pair.
14 Results are reported for each sub-component of the index, as well as the total.
12 There are limitations to the CPIS data as well. For instance, since it is based on surveys, underreporting may be an issue, and some economies are simply absent from the collection. See Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2003) for a detailed description of these data.
Measures of bilateral trade intensity are standard. In what follows, T is measured by the (scale independent) variant introduced by Deardorff (1998) and used in Clark and vanWincoop (1999) and Imbs (2004) . It writes
where EX i,j,t (IM i,j,t ) denotes total merchandise exports (imports) from country i to j in year t, NY i denotes nominal GDP in country i and NY W is world nominal output. Bilateral trade data are from the IMF's Direction of Trade Statistics.
Following Clark and vanWincoop (2001) and Imbs (2004) , sectoral real value added data are used to compute
where s n,i denotes the GDP share of industry n in country i. S i,j is the time average of the discrepancies in economic structures of countries i and j, and reaches its maximal value for two countries with no sector in common.
15 The sectoral shares s are computed using one-digit value added data covering all sectors of the eocnomy, from the United Nations Statistical Yearbook (UNYB), or, alternatively, two-digit manufacturing value added data from UNIDO.
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Finally, the variant of equation (2) focusing on traded-goods requires data on disaggregated consumption across countries. Lewis (1996) uses the United Nations International Comparison Program, which decomposes aggregate consumption into about one hundred goods in 1970, 1975, 1980 and 1985. Computing the international correlation in traded goods consumption ρ T C ij necessitates more time variation, which exists in an alternative, if coarser, dataset. The United Nations Statistical Yearbook provides a decomposition of consumption into roughly two-digit sectors across countries, and more importantly annually over the 1970-1996 period. 17 This is much less detailed than the 15 Both the trade and specialization measures are based on time averages. Results do not change if the initial value is used instead.
16 The UNIDO data covers manufactures only, and thus a shrinking share of most economies. The UNYB provide sectoral value added at the one-digit level for all sectors, but with reduced country coverage.
data in Lewis (1996) , but serves the purpose of verifying whether the results in Lewis (1996) continues to hold using the bilateral approach pursued in this paper.
The variables in La Porta et al (1998) fall into four distinct categories: (i) legal families, (ii) shareholders rights, (iii) creditors rights and (iv) enforcement. The subset of variables used to instrument Φ ij varies somewhat with different measures of Þnancial intergation (e.g. restriction indexes versus actual bilateral holdings). The instruments for T are well-established and consist of so-called gravity variables reßective of geographic characteristics. For clarity of exposition, all lists of instruments are reported in Appendix A. They are all chosen to maximize the Þrst-stage Þt.
Combining all these data sources and constraints generates a sample covering a cross-section of 41 countries, or 820 bilateral observations, or alternatively, a core of 12 and a periphery of 31 economies. The countries are listed in the Appendix.
Finance and Output Correlations
This section presents estimates of equation (1) and the system (S). Pure cross-sectional results are Þrst discussed, followed by the core-periphery evidence. (1), using Þrst the restriction-based measure of Φ, and then the actual data on bilateral holdings. In all cases, Þnance is signiÞ-cantly positive at least at the 5 percent conÞdence level: large restrictions are associated with low GDP correlations, and large assets cross-holdings tend to be associated with high GDP correlations. Estimates of α 2 and α 3 are in line with existing results, both quantitatively and qualitatively, with trade affecting cycles correlations positively and specialization negatively, both at the 5 percent conÞdence level. Standard results are conÞrmed, but the new conclusion that Þnancially integrated economies have more rather than less synchronized business cycles arises. A decomposition of the restriction indices into their four components suggests current account liberalizations are important in explaining cycle synchronization, whereas surrender of exports revenues is insigniÞcant. Paradoxically, restrictions to the exchange rate have a positive effect on cycle correlations, a result perhaps suggestive of the endogeneity of exchange rate arrangements to the asymmetry of cycles. Decomposing the CPIS data is somewhat less informative, although it appears that the prevalence of long-run debt contracts, as opposed to equity holdings or short term debt, is at the source of the signiÞcant estimates of α 1 . Table 2 introduces instruments for Þnance, trade and specialization. Φ is instrumented using a subset of the variables introduced in La Porta et al (1998) , chosen to maximize the Þrst-stage Þt, and listed in Appendix A. If OLS estimates of α 1 suffer from an endogeneity bias because capital ßows between economies with asymmetric cycles, IV estimates should yields larger values for α 1 . This is the case for both measures of Φ: α 1 roughly multiplies two-fold in both cases, once Φ is instrumented. Thus, the endogeneity of Þnance if anything goes against the main result in this paper. Instrumenting the other independent variables only reinforce the conclusions pertaining to trade and structure, as it did in Frankel and Romer (1999) or Imbs (2004) . The decomposition of Φ into its components is less informative in Table 2 , with no signiÞcant coefficient, although the point estimates have unchanged signs. This lack of conclusive results may come from the fact that the instrument sets are chosen to Þt the aggregate measures of Φ, rather than their components. Table 3 presents simultaneous estimates of the system (S), where the coefficients on the instruments have been omitted for clarity. The main attraction of these results is that they make it possible to disentangle the direct and indirect channels through which Þnance affects business cycles synchronization, which were embedded into singleequation estimates of (1). The Þrst result worth noticing is that point estimates of α 1 become slightly smaller in most cases, as they should given that indirect channels are now purged from the point estimate. The presence of indirect channels is particularly prevalent when Φ is measured using the AREAER restrictions indexes: there is in particular strong evidence that Þnancial liberalizations (as proxied by the lifting of restrictions to capital ßows) tend to be associated with trade in the goods markets. This is consistent with the notion that policy reforms tend to bundle, with trade and Þnancial liberalizations often happening simultaneously. In the case of actual capital holdings, though, there is little support for any interaction at all between Þnance and trade. To summarize, the data suggest some of the effects of Þnancial liberalization work through goods trade, but estimates of α 1 remains signiÞcant even after it is accounted for.
Main Results

Channels
Another channel working via specialization is apparent in the data. The sign of δ 1 is a priori ambivalent, as Þnancial integration could either favor specialization in different sectors, for instance according to comparative advantage, or in identical activities, for instance risky ones, more needful of external funds. The results in Table  3 suggest Þnance induced specialization is present in the data. δ 1 is actually positive and signiÞcant at the 1 percent conÞdence level in the Þrst two columns of the Table: this means that restrictions to Þnancial ßows tend to result in higher values for S, that is specialization in different economic activities. The second column actually controls for effective specialization in countries i and j, using the pairwise sum of HerÞndahl indices, but δ 1 remains signiÞcantly positive. This suggests that lifting restrictions would lower S, irrespective of the actual specialization pattern in countries i and j: it tends to make countries more similar in what they choose to produce, which in turn results in higher cycle correlations.
18 This effect is not unlike the theoretical effects of
Þnance developed in Obstfeld (1994) .
The evidence on indirect channels based on CPIS data is weaker, with hardly any signiÞcant impact of Þnance working through goods trade or specialization. But in all cases a residual direct positive effect of Þnance on cycle correlations subsists. It is not only because they trade more and specialize in speciÞc sectors that Þnancially integrated economies are synchronized: there is another, theoretically puzzling direct channel. Tables 4 and 5 reproduce the previous results, in the alternative reduced dataset measuring cycle correlations, trade, specialization and Þnancial integration between a core of 12 and a periphery of 31 countries, as opposed to all bilateral observations between 41 countries. The result is a maximum of 372 observations, thus a somewhat reduced cross-section, but one that lends itself more readily to investigating the real effects of integration between the Þnancial hubs in Europe, the United States and Japan, and the rest of the world. In particular, Φ is now measured using unilateral CPIS data, with Φ ij = I i . Financial integration is measured by the assets core economies choose to hold in a periphery country. To maximize coverage, S uses the UNIDO sample focused on three-digit manufacturing data. The sensitivity analysis in Section 5 presents results when Φ ij is measured in intensive terms, i.e. Φ ij = I ij +I ji I i +I j , and when the reduced UNYB sample is used to calculate S. No results change, but the sample is substantially smaller.
Core and Periphery
The Þrst two columns in Table 4 present OLS estimates, and the last two instrument Φ, T and S with the same sets of instruments as before. The results are even stronger than previously, with effects of Þnance that are larger both statistically and economically than in the previous cross-section, constructed on all bilateral linkages between 41 countries. This suggests the evidence in the previous section is not due to strong linkages between rich countries, but indeed rather because of core-periphery linkages. Coefficients on Trade and Structure have the expected sign, and become slightly less signiÞcant, although still at the 5 percent conÞdence level. This happens even though, in the core-periphery sample, the instruments for both T and S are considerably weaker than in the large sample. For instance, even the extended set of gravity variables listed in Appendix A accounts for barely 5 percent of the variation in trade intensity, as opposed to more than 30 percent in the large sample.
Decomposing CPIS into its components once again points to debt contracts, particularly short term, as the main culprit for the positive effect of Þnance. As before, instrumenting the independent variables only reinforces the results, as would be the case if the endogeneity biases at play here were attenuating, as predicted by theory. Interestingly, once instrumented, equity holdings are estimated to result in lower business cycles correlations, consistent with the international business cycle workhorse model. Perhaps surprisingly the last column in Table 4 Þnds little or no effect of trade and structure on cycles correlations, but this might very well be due to the relative weakness of the gravity variables in explaining trade patterns between the core and periphery economies in the sample.
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Finally, Table 5 presents simultaneous equation estimates of the system (S) in the core-periphery sample. All results continue to prevail: Φ affects ρ Y ij directly, with coefficients signiÞcant at the 5 percent conÞdence level, even though it does also tend to increase trade. The main difference here is the absence of any signiÞcant Þnance-induced response of S.
Risk Sharing and the Quantity Puzzle
This section focuses on the impact of Þnancial integration on consumption correlations, Þrst directly, then in relation to the quantity puzzle. Results pertaining to a crosssection of 41 countries are Þrst discussed, followed by a reduced sample focusing on a core of 12 rich countries.
Consumption Correlations
This section seeks to establish the signiÞcant role of Þnancial integration in affecting consumption correlations. Point estimates make it possible to quantify how much of a change in integration is necessary to equate international correlations in consumption and in output, on average. This corresponds to the view that consumption plans are less correlated than GDP because of impediments to risk sharing, i.e. that the quantity puzzle arises only from the consumption side. Put differently, it assumes GDP correlations are invariant to Þnancial linkages. Table 6 reports OLS estimates for equation (2), using both measures for Φ. In all cases, η 2 is strongly signiÞcant and positive. This suggests consumption plans are largely conditioned by available domestic output. Of course, it could also reßect that consumption is part of GDP, and it is GDP correlations that respond to ßuctuations in consumption. This is addressed later in the context of a simultaneous system of equations where the endogeneity of ρ Y ij is allowed for, following the logic developed in equation (1) and the previous section. More to the point, there is signiÞcant evidence that Þnancially integrated economies have more synchronized consumption plans, in particular when using the AREAER restrictions indexes. The Þrst and second columns of the table suggest economies with restrictions to capital ßows (and especially to the current account) have less synchronized consumption plans. The result is akin to Lewis (1996) , who cannot reject income insurance once Þnancial restrictions are controlled for, and based on the same dataset if not the same methodology. The second column suggests restrictions to the current account play a prominent role in preventing risk sharing.
Results for equation (2) based on the cross-holdings CPIS data are less marked. The overall estimate of η 1 is not signiÞcant, suggesting income insurance does not work via cross-holdings across all asset classes. 20 Breaking down the data into the components of the CPIS measure does however suggest more contrasted results, with income insurance working via equity holdings. On the other hand however, longterm debt contracts are associated with signiÞcantly lower consumption correlations, as if they actually worsened income insurance. These estimates are based on few observations, and hardly warrant any generalization. They do nevertheless suggest that risk sharing varies with classes of assets, and caution against hasty dismissals on the basis of aggregate data on Þnancial ßows or stocks.
The need to integrate Þnancial markets may well be endogenous, determined for instance by some (exogenously given) tendency for consumption plans to be idiosyncratic across countries. That would happen in economies with given fully diversiÞed production, and less of a need to integrate as a consequence. This is an attenuating endogeneity bias, since it suggests Þnance is redundant when consumption plans are correlated. Even though this bias goes against large estimates for η 1 , Table 7 presents instrumented variables estimations of equation (2). The results are largely unchanged: point estimates are almost identical, and the only notable difference is the lack of significance for any component of the CPIS variable in explaining consumption correlations. As before, the evidence that risk sharing is prevented by restrictions to capital ßows (and in particular restrictions to the current account) is present in the data.
For completeness, Table 8 presents estimates for equation (2) where ρ C ij is computed using consumption of traded-goods only. As these data are scarce at the yearly frequency, the size of the sample is substantially reduced relative to Tables 6 and 7 . Furthermore, estimates of η 1 in equation (2) do not provide direct tests of income insurance, for a non-signiÞcant coefficient does not necessarily imply lack of risk sharing. Table 8 only purports to investigate whether signiÞcant point estimates persist when focused on traded goods only, as they would if the presence of risk sharing in the data were obscured by the presence of uninsurable ßuctuations in non-traded goods consumption (and as they should to conÞrm the results in Lewis (1996) ). The estimates of η 1 in Table 8 remain signiÞcant in all cases where they previously were, i.e. particularly when Φ is measured using the AREAER restriction indexes. As before, restrictions to the current account appear to play a prominent role in limiting international risk 20 Lane (2001) Þnds that investment income ßows do not provide income insurance either.
sharing. 21, 22 The view that the quantity puzzle arises from low consumption correlations, because risk sharing is imperfect in the data, is one that would contend the international synchronization of consumption plans should reach, if not exceed that of GDP ßuctu-ations if only one could correct appropriately for frictions to Þnancial ßows. In other words, η 1 > 0, whereas α 1 is zero. The question is part qualitative (is α 1 indeed zero?), part quantitative (given estimates for η 1 , what is needed for ρ Table 7 to investigate how much Þnancial liberalization would be needed to push consumption correlations above ρ Y ij on average in the data. This helps assess the plausibility of the view that ascribes the quantity puzzle to consumption correlations only.
From the estimates in Table 7 , if only consumption correlations are allowed to respond to Þnancial integration, susbtantial changes in Φ are necessary. In the data, on averageρ C = 0.068 andρ Y = 0.1079, and a one-standard deviation fall in Φ increases ρ C ij by 0.033. Thus a one-to two-standard deviation fall in Φ would be sufficient to solve the quantity puzzle. In the AREAER data, a one-standard deviation fall corresponds to a jump from a country pair akin to Canada -Norway or Austria -Japan, to for instance Switzerland -United States, countries where all AREAER components equal zero over the whole period.
23 A two-standard deviation increase would correspond to a jump from such country pairs as Ireland -Mexico or Egypt -Switzerland, thus a rather substantial policy change. Focusing on the current account, the estimates for η 1 in the second column of Table 7 imply a one-standard deviation fall in Φ increases ρ C ij by 0.051. But a one-standard deviation increase in the index measuring restrictions to the current account is a sizeable policy change: it for instance amounts to moving from the situation in Peru, where Φ CA roughly equals 0.5 with all other rich countries, to Switzerland, where it is zero. In short, it seems the hypothesis that the quantity puzzle only exists because Þnan-21 Estimates of η 2 decrease substantially in magnitude between Tables 7 and 8. This is also consistent with Lewis' (1996) result that domestic output is less relevant to traded goods consumption than to the overall aggregate. 22 In unreported results, consumption correlations were computed adjusting for the real exchange rate, that is, allowing for deviations from PPP. The estimates do not change sizeably from Table 7 , conÞrming the results in Ravn (2003) . 23 The AREAER index equals zero for most country pairs involving Switzerland and another rich OECD economy. cial ßows are hindered in the data, and ρ C ij is abnormally low as a result, is quantitatively implausible. But none of these estimates (and few existing theories) account for the possibility that output correlations themselves respond positively to Þnancial integration, thus driving endogenously the discrepancy upwards. The next section assesses the relevance of this conjecture in the context of the quantity puzzle. Table 9 reports estimates of α 1 , α 2 , α 3 , η 1 and η 2 as implied by the simultaneous estimation of the system formed by equations (1) and (2). The endogeneity of ρ Y ij in equation (2) is now accounted for, via equation (1); further, Φ is instrumented using the same set of variables as in the previous single-equation estimations. Simultaneity does not alter the earlier results: restrictions-based measures of Φ affect consumption correlations signiÞcantly, while cross-holdings seem irrelevant. But both measures have a strong synchronizing effect on GDP correlations. The advantage of the simultaneous approach lies in the possibility of a direct comparison of the estimates for α 1 and η 1 . Table 9 conÞrms that estimates for α 1 are substantially larger in magnitude than for η 1 . From the stanpoint of the quantity puzzle, the economically and statistically relevant empirical regularity is not (only) the presence or absence of risk sharing, but rather the surprisingly strong impact Þnancial integration has on GDP correlations. Imperfect Þnancial linkages in the data result in lower realizations of ρ C ij , but more importantly, in much lower realizations of ρ Y ij as well, which makes the assumption that GDP correlations are invariant to Þnancial integration particularly difficult to maintain. The quantity puzzle becomes twofold: (i) why is α 1 positive? (ii) is ρ Y ij still larger than ρ C ij once the effect of Þnance on both is accounted for? Question (ii) is the accurate test of the international business cycles model, although it still leaves question (i) unanswered.
The Quantity Puzzle
Empirically, abstracting from the effects of Φ on ρ Y ij means using the estimates of α 1 in Table 9 to assess how much lower GDP correlations would be in the absence of any effects of Þnance on cycle synchronization. When evaluating how much ρ C ij increases in a world with lower average Þnancial restrictions (e.g. by one-standard deviation), one should also subtract from ρ Y ij the effect this liberalization has on GDP correlations. The resulting differential effect documents how Þnancial integration affects the quantity puzzle in a world where Φ only affects ρ Based on CPIS data, the effect is even larger. Estimates of α 1 imply ρ Y ij rises on average by 0.117 in response to a one-standard deviation increase in assets crossholdings, whereas η 1 is not signiÞcant. In other words, in these data the bulk of the quantity puzzle originates in the tendency for GDP correlations to increase with Þnancial links, not in low risk sharing. A theory that ignores this effect should be put to a test that controls for it, i.e. one that holds GDP correlations constant, exactly 0.117 closer to ρ C ij than the raw data suggest. It then becomes possible that the quantity puzzle should prevail in the data because the existing Þnancial linkages have a much larger positive effect on GDP correlations than they do on consumption correlations.
Tables 10 and 11 reproduce the analysis in the reduced sample formed by linkages between a core of 12 and a periphery of 31 economies. Since the focus is now on country pairs that are mostly formed of one rich and one developing economy, the restriction based measure of Φ is abandoned, for lack of sufficient variation. The results are therefore presented for the CPIS data only. Table 10 focuses on equation (2), and Þnds no evidence of income risk sharing working via assets holdings. This may suggest there is little risk sharing between our core and periphery, or that income insurance in the periphery is not captured by the bilateral approach in equation (2). Lack of signiÞcance of η 1 does not mean lack of risk sharing.
Finally, Table 11 presents the results for equations (1) and (2) estimated simultaneously. The single equation conclusions continue to prevail. Assets bilateral crossholdings provide little income insurance, and they do tend to result in synchronized GDP ßuctuations. Once again, the interesting result pertains to the relative magnitude of the two effects. In this sample, the point estimate for α 1 implies a one-standard deviation rise in Φ augments ρ Y ij by 0.188. The presence of some Þnancial links in the data could indeed be the very reason for the quantity puzzle: as pairs of countries integrate their asset markets, risk sharing may improve and consumption correlations rise as a result. But in these data GDP correlations increase by much more, so an econometrician will naturally be led to believe the data invalidate the standard model. If they do, it is solely because of the effect Þnance has on cycles synchronization, indeed the true question behind the quantity puzzle.
Sensitivity Analysis
This section ensures the robustness of the main results. Appendices C and D present variations of the estimations in the main text, for both the large 41 countries sample and the core-periphery approach, respectively. Simultaneous estimates of the system (S) are presented, Þrst with additional controls, and with alternative measures. The same variations are then applied to the system formed by equations (1) and (2), namely the one addressing directly the quantity puzzle.
Large Sample
Controls
SigniÞcant estimates for α 1 in the system (S) may simply arise from the tendency for rich countries within the sample of 41 economies to both display synchronized GDP ßuctuations and be integrated on the asset market (although the reduced coreperiphery sample already works to assuage this concern). This suggests controlling for per capita GDP in the Þrst equation of the system. Table C1 describes how the results are altered when the speciÞcation is thus modiÞed: the AREAER restrictionbased measure becomes insigniÞcant, but only through its direct effect: the indirect channels via specialization and trade remain large economically and statistically. This suggests restrictions to Þnancial ßows mostly occur in lesser developed economies. However, when using the CPIS data, α 1 remains signiÞcant even holding per capita GDP constant: it is not merely positive because of a inherent difference between rich and poor countries in the sample.
Alternatively, α 1 could appear to be signiÞcant because Þnancially integrated economies both have large Þnancial sectors, and co-ßuctuate as a result. Table B1 also presents estimates correcting for this possibility. The pairwise sums of output shares for the Financial Services, Insurance and Real Estate (FIRE) sector are included in the set of independent variables, a proxy meant to capture whether pairs of countries with high Φ also both have large output shares in the FIRE sector. While the restrictions-based measure of Φ indeed loses its direct signiÞcance (but the indirect channels survive), α 1 remains signiÞcantly positive when estimated on the basis of the CPIS data. Interestingly, in both cases the F IRE variables is signiÞcantly negative in the Structure equation, i.e. the Þnancial sector is indeed an important component of S, the measure of sectoral similarities. Table C2 purports to investigate whether coefficient estimates of the system (S) are affected by the coordination of macroeconomic policies, most prominently monetary. This is also one of the purposes of using a reduced core-periphery sample, where most country pairs committed to a monetary union (or indeed a trade agreement) are excluded from the analysis. It is reassuring that the core-periphery approach should yield stronger results if anything. Nevertheless, Table C2 includes controls for currency unions, differentials in inßation rates, and the volatility of the nominal exchange rate. The bottomline is that none of these controls modify in any manner the signiÞcance of α 1 , nor do they alter substantially any other point estimates. Two interesting exceptions are the results that currency unions tend to boost trade -a well known fact established in Rose (2000) , and tend also to foster specialization in different sectors.
OECD Sample and Alternative Measures
It is also possible that the main results in this paper should be driven by discrepancies between rich and poor economies, that is by a phenomenon that does not exist amongst rich OECD countries. To verify whether this is the case, Table C3 presents results where the sample is reduced to the pairwise linkages between 21 OECD countries. Unsurprisingly, restrictions-based measures of Φ do not have any effects on GDP correlations (although they still correlate strongly with trade linkages), since AREAER indexes of restrictions to capital ßows hardly have any variation in OECD economies. Nevertheless, once again, the CPIS data continues to predict a similar pattern to the one in the complete sample, and in particular a large signiÞcant direct effect on GDP correlations. Table C3 also presents results when the measure of sectoral similarities S is computed on the basis of three-digit manufacturing data. The advantage is larger coverage, for these data are available for more countries. The drawback is the focus on manufacturing sectors only, indeed a shrinking share of the economy in most developed countries. The main results are unchanged: Þnance continues to matter directly for GDP correlations, and S still enters with a negative sign, namely sectoral patterns do affect cycles synchronization. Using this alternative measure, there is more evidence that Þnancial linkages build upon existing trade relations than the other way round. This suggests the trade-enhancing effects of Þnancial linkages is not a robust feature of the data, and the two are closely intertwined. 24 24 Disentangling the channel of causality between trade and Þnance could be done with time variation in measures of Φ, which does not exist yet, but is soon to come given the CPIS exercise is annual. Table C4 uses the Þlter introduced in Baxter and King (1999) to isolate the cyclical component of GDP. 25 The results are stronger for both measures of Φ. In all cases, the direct effect of Þnance on GDP correlations is signiÞcant and large, and when Φ is measured in the AREAER data, Þnancially integrated economies trade more, and tend to specialize in similar sectors. The last column in Table B4 uses an intensive measure of Φ in the CPIS data, once again with little effect on the estimate of interest since α 1 still comes out signiÞcantly positive. The only notable change is the (weakly signiÞcant) negative effect of trade on Þnance.
Finally, Table C5 extends some of the previous sensitivity analysis to consumption correlations, focusing on the Þlter used to isolate the cyclical components of GDP and consumption. The variations in Tables C1 to C4 are omitted for clarity, since most of them pertain to output but not consumption correlations. No results are affected, except the evidence in favor of risk sharing, i.e. signiÞcant estimates for η 1 is now stronger when Φ is measured in the CPIS data. But in all cases α 1 is signiÞcant: no matter the measure, the answer to the quantity puzzle lies in the response of GDP correlations to Þnancial integration.
Core-Periphery
Appendix D presents some sensitivity analysis pertaining to the reduced sample. Since policy controls and variables pertaining to per capita GDP are less relevant to the core-periphery approach, the focus in Tables D1 and D2 is on measures of S, Φ, and the Þlter used.
The main text discusses estimations of the system (S) in the core-periphery sample when S is measured using (a larger sample of) manufacturing output data observed at the three-digit aggregation level. While this affords more observations, it is in effect different from what is done for the 41-country sample. Table D1 Þrst shows the main results still obtain when S is measured using one-digit data from UNYB. The main difference in the results pertains to the weak instrumentation of T and S. Perhaps surprisingly, the gravity model performs poorly in the core-periphery sample chosen here, a weakness that affects all coefficients in the simultaneous estimation. It might explain the sign of the estimates for α 3 . In spite of this weakness however, α 1 remains signiÞcantly positive in all cases. Indeed, it is the sole point estimates whose signiÞcance or sign does not change with the different speciÞcations reported on Table  D1 . While the impact of trade or structure on GDP correlations varies somewhat with the measure for Φ (column (ii)) and the Þlter (column (iii)), the direct positive effect of Þnancial integration on GDP correlations is always large and signiÞcant.
Finally, Table D2 focuses on the quantity puzzle using different Þlters. The BaxterKing Þlter yields results that are identical to those implied by the Hodrick-Prescott approach, with if anything less evidence in favor of risk sharing. The point estimate for η 1 remains much lower than for α 1 . Financial integration has much more of an effect on GDP correlations than it does on consumption. 26 
Conclusion
This paper presents systematic evidence on the effects of Þnancial integration on the international correlations in both output and consumption, with a view to shedding light on the quantity puzzle. Consistent with theory, Þnancial linkages increase consumption correlations, in some cases. Less consistent with theory, a variety of measures suggest more integrated economies also have more synchronized GDP ßuctuations, in virtually all cases. The latter effect is larger than the former, thus explaining why GDP ßuctuations are more correlated on average than consumption plans. The quantity puzzle does not arise from lack of risk sharing, and low consumption correlations as a result, but rather from the theoretically intriguing fact that Þnancial integration does affect GDP correlations, too. 26 If GDP is measured with error in country i, the resulting country-speciÞc variance will perturb all country pairs in the sample where country i is involved. The cross-section of pairwise correlations will display heteroscedasticity of a type that standard White corrections cannot account for. Clark and vanWincoop (1999) suggest the use of a GMM estimator to account for this possibility, an approach Imbs (2004) extends to a similar context of simultaneous equations. For the sake of brevity, GMM estimates are not reported in the text. The main conclusions of the paper do however continue to prevail, at times even stronger.
Appendix:
A. Instruments Lists:
Financial Integration Φ as measured by the AREAER restrictions indexes:
(i) Pairwise sum of per capita GDP (ii) An indicator variable for the civil legal tradition (iii) Measures of shareholders rights, i.e. variables capturing if votes are cast cumulatively or proportionately, minority shareholders are oppressed, shareholders have pre-emptive rights, proxy by mail are valid votes, as well as the percentage necessary to call an extraordinary shareholder's meeting (iv) Measures of creditors rights, i.e.: the percentage of capital required as legal reserves, whether management is allowed to stay in reorganization and whether there is automatic stay on asset (v) Enforcement variables, i.e.: the efficiency of the judicial system, a rule of law index and ratings of accounting standards.
Financial Integration Φ as measured by the CPIS data (in the large sample):
(i) Pairwise sum of per capita GDP (ii) Measures of shareholders rights, i.e. variables capturing if shares can be blocked prior to general meetings, votes are cast cumulatively or proportionately, minority shareholders are oppressed, shareholders have pre-emptive rights, proxy by mail are valid votes, as well as the percentage of votes necessary to call an extraordinary meeting and an index of anti-director rights (iii) An index of creditors' rights, the percentage of capital required as legal reserves and whether secured creditors are paid Þrst (iv) Enforcement variables, i.e.: measures of corruption, and the risks of expropriation and contract repudiation.
Financial Integration Φ as measured by the CPIS data (in the core-periphery sample):
(i) Pairwise sum of per capita GDP (ii) Indicator variables for the French, German and British legislative families (iii) Measures of shareholders rights, i.e. variables capturing whether shares can be blocked prior to general meetings, votes are cast cumulatively or proportionately, proxy by mail are valid votes, and whether one share carries one vote (iv) Measures of creditors rights, i.e.: the percentage of capital required as legal reserves, whether secured creditors are paid Þrst, and whether management stays after reorganizations (v) Enforcement variables, including accounting standards and the rule of law.
Bilateral Trade T in the large sample: indicator variables for the presence of a common language and a border, kilometric distance between main cities and the pairwise sum of geographic areas.
Bilateral Trade T in the core-periphery sample: kilometric distance, both raw and GDPweighted, indicator variables for the presence of trade agreements, islands, landlocked economies and the existence of a past colonial link, pairwise population and GDP products, and the pairwise sum of geographic areas. Specialization Patterns S: pairwise sums and differences in per capita GDP. Notes: The dependent variable is the pairwise correlation of HP-Þltered GDP. "Trade" denotes bilateral trade intensity T , "Structure" is the index S of similarity in sectoral output, constructed using all one-digit activities. The "Restrictions" estimations use the average of the four AREAER measures of restrictions to capital ßows to measure "Finance". The Notes: The dependent variable is the pairwise correlation of HP-Þltered GDP. "Trade" denotes bilateral trade intensity T , "Structure" is the index S of similarity in sectoral output, constructed using all one-digit activities. The "Restrictions" estimations use the average of the four AREAER measures of restrictions to capital ßows to measure "Finance". The Notes: The dependent variable is the pairwise correlation of HP-Þltered GDP. "Trade" denotes bilateral trade intensity T , "Structure" is the index S of similarity in sectoral output, constructed using three-digit manufacturing activities from the UNIDO dataset in columns
B. Country Coverage
(ii) and (iv), and the UNYB measure in others. The "Restrictions" estimations use the average of the four AREAER measures of restrictions to capital ßows to measure "Finance". The Notes: The dependent variable is the pairwise correlation of Baxter-King Þltered GDP.
"Trade" denotes bilateral trade intensity T , "Structure" is the index S of similarity in sectoral output, constructed using all one-digit activities. The "Restrictions" estimations use the average of the four AREAER measures of restrictions to capital ßows to measure "Finance". The Notes: The dependent variable under the "ρ C " heading is the pairwise correlation ßuctua-tions in consumption, as implied by the Baxter-King Þlter. "Output" denotes the pairwise correlation of BK-Þltered GDP, which is also the dependent variable under the "ρ Y " heading.
"Trade" denotes bilateral trade intensity T , "Structure" is the index S of similarity in sectoral output, constructed using one-digit data. The "Restrictions" estimations use the average of the four AREAER measures of restrictions to capital ßows to measure "Finance". The "Holdings" estimations use the IMF's Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey, in million USD.
All instruments are listed in Appendix A. All variables enter in levels.
D. Sensitivity: Core-Periphery Sample Notes: The dependent variable is the pairwise correlation of HP-Þltered GDP (except for the speciÞcation marked "BK", where the Baxter-King Þlter is used instead), computed between a core (12 countries) and a periphery (31 countries). "Trade" denotes bilateral trade intensity T , "Structure" is the index S of similarity in sectoral output, constructed using all one-digit data in the column marked "UNYB", and three-digit manufacturing data in the others. "Finance" is measured using the IMF's Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey, in million USD, except in column (ii) where it is in intensive form. All instruments are listed in Appendix A. All variables enter in levels. Notes: The dependent variable under the "ρ C " heading is the pairwise correlation of ßuctu-ations in consumption, isolated using the Baxter-King Þlter. "Output" denotes the pairwise correlation of BK-Þltered GDP, which is also the dependent variable under the "ρ Y " heading.
"Trade" denotes bilateral trade intensity T , "Structure" is the index S of similarity in sectoral output, constructed using three-digit manufacturing data. The "Holdings" estimations use the IMF's Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey, in million USD. All instruments are listed in Appendix A. All variables enter in levels. Notes: The dependent variable is the pairwise correlation of HP-Þltered GDP, computed between a core (12 countries) and a periphery (31 countries). "Trade" denotes bilateral trade intensity T , "Structure" is the index S of similarity in sectoral output, constructed using three-digit manufacturing data. "Finance" is measured using the IMF's Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey, in intensive terms. All instruments are listed in Appendix A.
All variables enter in levels. Notes: The dependent variable under the "ρ C " heading is the pairwise correlation of HP- Notes: The dependent variable is the pairwise correlation of HP-Þltered Consumption, computed between a core (12 countries) and a periphery (31 countries). "Output" denotes the pairwise correlation of HP-Þltered GDP, used as a dependent variable in previous estimations.
"Trade" denotes bilateral trade intensity T , "Structure" is the index S of similarity in sectoral output, constructed using three-digit manufacturing data. "Finance" is measured using the IMF's Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey, in million USD. Financial integration is also decomposed into its components. All instruments are listed in Appendix A. All variables enter in levels. Notes: The dependent variable under the "ρ C " heading is the pairwise correlation of HPÞltered consumption. "Output" denotes the pairwise correlation of HP-Þltered GDP, which is also the dependent variable under the "ρ Y " heading. "Trade" denotes bilateral trade intensity T , "Structure" is the index S of similarity in sectoral output, constructed using three-digit manufacturing data. The "Holdings" estimations use the IMF's Coordinated
Portfolio Investment Survey, in million USD. All instruments are listed in Appendix A. All variables enter in levels.
